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THE COLORADO RIVER SALINITY AGREEMENT OF
1973 AND THE MEXICALI VALLEY*
DALE BECK FURNISHt and JERRY R. LADMANf

INTRODUCTION
The Colorado is an important river. Its waters, perhaps more than
any other single factor, have made possible the rapid development of
the southwestern United States.' The river's waters probably have
been even more important to the development of the Mexicali and
San Luis Valleys, in the Mexican states of Baja California and
Sonora. The Colorado was originally a wild and woolly river and,
true to this nature, the history of development and use of its waters
has not run smoothly. Competing demands for the limited resource
have given rise to a number of continuing controversies and agreements, including a compact among the seven affected states in the
U.S., and a treaty between Mexico and this country.
The Mexican-United States Water Treaty was signed in 1944. The
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), composed of
experts from both sides of the border, is charged with applying the
Treaty and resolving controversies which may arise concerning its
terms. Since 1961 the IBWC has wrestled with the problem of salinity in the Colorado River. A series of Minutes, the official resolutions
of the IBWC, have dealt with the problem. None did so definitively
until August 1973, when the commissioners signed Minute 242, entitled "Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River." 2 It is our belief that the
Salinity Agreement is likely to be neither permanent nor d'efinitive.
In this collaboration of economist and lawyer our objective is to set
forth some of the most troublesome aspects of the problem for the
Mexicali and San Luis Valleys, and their attendant ramifications for
United States-Mexican relations and international law. Consequently,
this short paper has two basic parts: (1) an exposition of the eco*Revised version of paper presented at Oaxtepec, Mexico, March 15, 1974. Research for
this article was assisted by a grant to Professor Ladman from Resources for the Future, Inc.,
which deals with the economic history of the Mexicali region.
tProfessor of Law, Arizona State University.
tAssociate Professor -of Economics, Arizona State University.
1. See, eg., Findley, The Bittersweet Waters of the Lower Colorado, 144 Nat'l Geographic 540 (1973).
2. Reprinted in this issue at p. 2.
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nomic importance of the Colorado River to its Mexican users, and
(2) an analysis of the problems with the Salinity Agreement of 1973,
Minute 242.
THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE COLORADO RIVER TO MEXICO
The Mexicali and San Luis Valleys (hereafter referred to as simply
the Mexicali Valley, unless it is necessary to refer specifically to the
San Luis Valley) are a continuation of the Imperial Valley in California. The Mexicali Valley is ringed by low mountains down to the
Gulf of California and is virtually flat. The fine-textured clay soil of
the valley was formed as a delta to the Colorado as the river lost
velocity approaching the sea. Its climate is hot and arid, and crop
agriculture is impossible without irrigation. In the valley the Mexican
Government has established the Colorado River Irrigation District.
This district encompasses 203,080 hectares (501,606 acres) which
corresponds to about seven percent of the irrigated land in Mexico.'
The city of Mexicali is the urban center of the valley. Serving as both
the capital of the state of Baja California and the county seat of
Mexicali County, the city had a population of 263,498 in 1970. San
Luis, Sonora, is the major Mexican urban center on the east side of
the Colorado River, but is much smaller than Mexicali (In 1970 it
had a population of 49,990.) and economically speaking is virtually
an appendage of the larger city.
Economic growth of the Mexicali Valley has been overwhelmingly
tied to local agriculture. It is precisely because of the essential need
for irrigation water from the Colorado River, of sufficient quantity
and quality to support this agriculture, that controversies have arisen
between the United States and Mexico and agreements between the
two countries have been made.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW TO 1961
During the latter part of the 19th century it was natural that
entrepreneuring United States land developers should cast eyes at the
vacant Mexicali Valley as California's Imperial Valley began serious
and profitable agricultural development. The economic incentive was
accentuated by the failure of attempts to build a canal across the
sand dunes separating the Colorado River and the Imperial Valley,
when the best alternative was to divert water through the Alamo
River Channel in Mexico. An agreement with Mexico brought the
3. S. Elizondo & Q. Felix, Rehabilitation Works of Colorado Irrigation District, Mexicali,
Baja California and San Luis R. C. Sonora (Dist. de Riego #14, mimeo (1972).
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first irrigation flow to both Mexico and the United States through
the Alamo River in 1901.' In 1902, after several abortive attempts
to gain control of the Mexicali Valley, the United States-owned
Colorado River Land Company obtained a concession from the Mexican Government and within a few years became owner of practically
the whole valley.s
The Colorado River Land Company developed irrigation facilities
and rapidly expanded production of the valley's monocrop, cotton.
In 1913 twelve hectares (I hectare = 2.471 acres) of cotton were
planted, but by 1929 there were 64,000 hectares under cultivation in
the fiber. 6 Prior to this time the valley had been at best sparsely
populated. With no indigenous labor supply, large numbers of Chinese were brought in, and, until the late 1930's, the Mexicali Valley
represented a foreign enclave tucked just under the international
border.
Several important events in the 1930's resulted in Mexicanization
of the valley and stimulated the beginning of considerable migration
to the area by Mexican nationals. First, a massive land reform program pushed by the activist president LMzaro C~rdenas began to
break ,up the land monopolies. By the mid-1940's most of such land
had been redistributed to ejidatarios,small private owners. This redistribution encouraged migration from the interior of Mexico to the
northern valley, and served to spread the income from cotton across
many, rather than just a few, families.
In consideration of the geographical isolation of the Baja California peninsula, a Free Zone was established for the Mexicali Valley in
1935.1 Under this designation persons residing there could import
goods from abroad duty-free. Given the generally low level of economic development in Mexico at the time, the Free Zone represented
an attractive inducement for migration to the area. It also facilitated
the development of the economy by permitting the duty-free importation of agricultural and manufacturing equipment.
As a consequence of these various factors, by the mid-1940's the
agriculture of the valley was firmly in the hands of Mexicans, and the
4. F. Robles, Mexicali-Calexico 57 (1971).
5. IcL, at 37.
6. Asociaci6n Algondonera del Valle de Mexicali, S.C., Relaci6n de areas sembradas y
produccion de pacas en el Valle de Mexicali y San Luis (1965).
7. The Free Zone was begun on an experimental basis by a Presidential Decree of 30
August, 1933, for the areas of Tijuana and Ensenada, of the Territory of Northern Baja
California. Observing the success in these two sites in 1935 it was extended to include the
areas of Mexicali, Tecate in Northern Baja California as well as San Luis, Sonora. Later it
was extended as far east as Agua Prieta, Sonora, and to the whole of the Baja California
Peninsula as well as to Chetumal and Cozumel in Quintana Roo Territory. Banco de Comercio, S.A., La economia del estado de Baja California, at 55-57 (1968).
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area, which had already experienced a substantial population increase
in fifteen years (see Table I) was on the brink of a population explosion and economic expansion, both of which continue today. Simultaneously, the Second World War created employment opportunities
for Mexican farmworkers in the United States, and additional people
flowed into Mexicali, the most obvious jumping-off point for the
agricultural operations of California, Arizona, and points north. The
result was still further population growth and a burgeoning labor
supply, for many could not find work north of the border or preferred to remain in Mexico.
TABLE I

The Population of Mexicali County and City
Year

County

City

1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970

1,417
14,599
29,985
44,399
124,362
281,333
396,324

462
6,782
14,482
18,775
64,658
174,540
263,498

Source: F. Robles, Mexicali-Calxico (1971); Direccion General de Estadistica, Secretaria
de Industria y Comercio, IX Censo general de poblaci6n, Estado de Baja California,
1970 (1971).

In 1942, with the completion of the All American Canal, it was no
longer necessary for the United States to transport water to the
Imperial Valley via the Alamo Canal. Shortly thereafter, following a
serious drought in 1943, the 1944 Water Treaty with the United
States guaranteed Mexico 1.5 million acre feet of Colorado River
water annually. The Mexican quota, generous when measured against
historical water use in the Mexicali Valley, further encouraged the
expansion of agriculture, which could extend without concern over
eventual loss of water rights.8 Cotton planting experienced another
jump upward, as the reshuffled land tenure system stabilized and the
world market price for the natural fiber remained strong. Primarily
an export crop, cotton has proved important to Mexico as a source
of foreign-exchange earnings needed in the country's continuing
quest for modernization. High cotton prices held through the period
of the Korean Conflict, and the Mexicali Valley continued to prosper
8. Mexico enjoyed delivery of much more than 1.5 million acre-feet per year at this time,
and often used more than its strict allotment. See Friedkin, The Colorado River: International Aspects, 12 Natural Resources J. 515 (1972), reprinted in Pollution and International Boundaries 36 (A. Utton ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Utton].

MEXICALI VALLEY

January 19751]

and expand. In 1952 the territory of Baja California Norte was declared a state and Mexicali was named its capital.
By 1955 Mexicali had become the leading cotton-producing region
in the country. In that year as shown in Figure I the land space in
FIGURE I
PRODUCTION AND HECTARES PLANTED OF
MAJOR CROPS GROWN IN THE
COLORADO RIVER IRRIGATION DISTRICT 1948-1972
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the valley planted in cotton peaked at 195,159 hectares and began to
fall off, coming back down to 139,974 hectares by 1960. However,
during this period yields per hectare rose so that production did not
decline radically from the peak year of 1955. Simultaneously, a
marked increase in the hectarage and production of wheat can be
noted. In part this was probably due to the declining attractiveness
of cotton, but also may be due to the decrease of available irrigation
water during the peak months of tne cotton season. The two crops
are not competitive for monthly water in Mexicali, as cotton is
grown over the summer cycle and wheat is grown in the winter cycle.
Most Mexicali wheat is exported out of the area, primarily to the
interior of Mexico.
The cotton boom had a strong positive effect on activities linked
to the cotton economy. The number of farm supply establishments,
cotton gins, and agricultural credit sources increased apace. Thus by
1960 the Mexicali economy was firmly established as one of the
strongest commercial agricultural areas in the country. Agriculture
was not only the backbone of the local economy, but had become
important to the national economy as a source of income and foreign
exchange as well as for its wheat which was badly needed to help
feed the country's burgeoning population. Table II shows that by
TABLE II

Agricultural Employment in the Mexicali Valley 1930-1970
Number of persons employed
Percentage of total employment

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

9,213
72.6*

9,568
66.9*

24,353
58.8

47,623
52.6

32,820
33.2

*Percentage computed as agricultural workers/total employment. It does not take account
of unemployment and hence will overstate the percent of work force employed in agriculture.
Sources: Direcci6n General de Estadistica, Secretaria de la Econ6mia Nacional, 60 Censo de
poblaci6n, 1940 Territorio de Baja California Norte (1947); Direcci6n General de
Estadistica, Secretaria de la Econ6mia Nacional, Septimo Censo general de poblaci6n, 1950, Baja California Territorio Norte; Direcci6n General de Estadistica,
Secretaria de Industria y Comercio, VIII Censo general de poblaci6n, 1960, Estado
de Baja California (1973); Direcci6n General de Estadistica, Secretaria de Industria
y Comercio, IX Censo general de poblaci6n, Estado de Baja California, 1970

(1971).

1960 almost 48,000 persons in the Mexicali Valley (not including
San Luis) were employed in agriculture; i.e., almost double the figure
for 1950 and five times the number recorded in 1930.
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WELLTON-MOHAWK DRAINAGE AND THE MEXICAN ADJUSTMENT

At about this time, a subsoil drainage problem developed in the
Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation Project area in Arizona, where briny subterranean waters were so close to root level that there was no space
for irrigation waters to drain. In order to resolve this problem a large
number of wells were drilled in the area to pump out the briny
subterranean waters, thus allowing space for proper drainage of subsequent irrigation waters. Beginning in the winter of 1961 the highly
salinated drainage water from the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation Project
was dumped into the Colorado River and began flowing into Mexico.
Considerable consternation developed in Mexicali as the salt concentration of the irrigation waters of this prosperous agricultural zone
reached a high level of 2,700 parts per million in late 1961,' up from
the previous normal reading of about 800 parts per million.' 0 This
water was reluctantly allowed to flow directly to the sea. Demonstrations, parades, and news conferences were held by angry Mexicalians on the streets of the capital city and in front of Mexican and
United States officials and press. Salinity readings never returned to
their pre-1961 levels but had stabilized at about 1250 parts per million before the 1973 Agreement.1 1
As indicated by Table III and Figure I, beginning in 1961 there
was a substantial decrease in total hectares irrigated. The salinity
problem was the cause on two accounts. First, the high concentration of salt in the water rendered marginal lands unprofitable due to
decreased yields. Second, because of reduced supplies of usablequality water, the irrigation district imposed a rationing system
which required all users to reduce their hectarage by ten percent.' 2
These developments combined with rising costs of other inputs
9. See, Meyers & Nobel, The Colorado River: The Treaty with Mexico, 19 Stan L. Rev.
367, 409 (1967); Hundley, The Colorado Waters Dispute, 42 Foreign Affairs 495, 499
(1964). There is apparently a discrepancy in salinity-reading methods utilized by Mexican
and United States authorities with the former consistently deriving higher readings. This is
recognized in Minute 242s paragraph 1 (a) which provides two figures for the permissible
salinity increase below Imperial Dam, one "U.S. count" and one "Mexican count." The
authors have attempted to cite only U.S. count figures in the text.
10. See, Friedkin, supra note 8, Exhibit 2 at 519, Utton at 40.
11. Id. Mexican count figures might be substantially higher. See H. Villareal, El Valle de
Mexicali 14 (Mem. 294, Dist. de Riego #14, mimeo. 1971), who states that salinity levels
fluctuated between 900 and 1000 ppm before 1961 and in recent years has stabilized at
between 1,300 and 1,400 ppm.
12. Since almost all farmers in the valley have plots of 20 hectares, this represented a
reduction from 20 to 18 hectares. In 1968 due to further reductions in the water supply,
they reduced irrigated acreage per user from 18 to 16 hectares. Asociaci6n Algodonera del
Valle de Mexicali y San Luis, Rio Colorado, Sonora, Informe anual de ciclo algodonero
(1961-62 & 1967-68).
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TABLE III
Distribution of Irrigation Water in
Mexicali and San Luis Valleys
(Hectares)
Crop Cycle
1957-58
1958-59
1959-60
1960-61
1961-62
1962-63
1963-64
1964-65

Total Irrigated
Land
216,752
191,362
190,030
186,090
156,059
153,633
162,211
155,237

Gravity Fed
167,678
149,262
134,536
128,220
115,865
113,992
118,746
113,345

Pumped From
Wells
49,074
42,100
54,494
56,870
40,194
39,641
43,465
41,892

1965-66

179,159

111,601

67,558

1966-67
1967-68
1968-69
1969-70
1970-71
1971-72

178,020
176,716
173,982
172,635
173,646
171,561

112,551
106,281
103,833
100,082
98,471
97,977

65,469
70,435
70,149
72,553
75,175
73,584

Source: Secretaria de Recursos Hidriulicos, Distrito de Riego #14, Mexicali.

(without a corresponding increase in world cotton prices) to magnify
the impact on the Mexicali farmers.
Given the ultimate importance of higher quality water to the Mexicali economy and the importance of that economy's participation in
the overall national economy of Mexico, it is not surprising that the
country's reaction to the high-salinity water was loud and swift. The
details are recounted in other places.' 3 Suffice it to state here that
the Wellton-Mohawk drainage acted as the catalyst for opening
negotiations on a series of questions, all of which are important,
none of which were resolved under the Treaty of 1944, and some of
which appear to remain after the signing of the Salinity Agreement
of 1973.
The first negotiated agreement on the problem took four years to
achieve and was limited by its own terms to five years' duration.'
13. See, N. Hundley, Dividing the Waters: A Century of Controversy Between the United
States and Mexico, (1966); Meyers & Noble, supra note 9, at 367, 409-411 (1967); Gantz,
United States Approaches to the Salinity Problem on the Colorado River 12 Natural Resources J. 496, 500 (1972), reprinted in Utton, supra note 8, at 17, 21; Taybor, WelntonMohawk Drainage and the Mexican Salt Problem (paper presented to the Herbert Brownell
Task Force and the Committee of Fourteen, October 11, 1972).
14. Despite its express five-year duration, Minute 218 was originally supposed to have
been drafted as a "permanent and effective solution" to the salinity problem, according to
the original mandate which brought the International Boundary and Water Commission
together. See 4 Int'l Legal Materials 545 (1965) 55 Dep't of State Bull. 555 (1965); Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria, 1964-65, at 545.
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Minute 218, signed by the commissioners and secretaries for the
IBWC in March 1965, provided that the United States would construct an extension of the Wellton-Mohawk conveyance channel to
carry the drainage to the Morelos Dam in Mexican territory.' ' It
might then be delivered either above or below the dam; i.e., included
in the irrigation water diverted to the Mexicali Valley or allowed to
pass freely down the Colorado River channel to the Gulf of California, at Mexico's discretion. It was contemplated that the most saline
drainage wells would be pumped during the winter, when flow was
diminished and the irrigation requirements in Mexicali were reduced.
This water could be bypassed. In summer, when irrigation needs were
high and flow increased, the least saline wells in the Wellton-Mohawk
district would be pumped and their discharge allowed to mingle with
the Colorado River waters above Morelos Dam. Building the extension channel and improving the drainage wells on the WelltonMohawk District cost the United States about $11 million.' 6
Minute 218 was careful to specify that its provisions did not "constitute any precedent, recognition, or acceptance affecting the rights
of either country.' 1 7 It was clear that negotiations had not been
terminated. Simple breathing space had been provided for the two
countries. Minute 218 was extended twice for one-year periods,
probably for reasons of political expediency, finally running out in
1972.'8

Other events compounded the salinity problem in the Mexicali
Valley. In 1965 cotton suffered another major blow when a change
in United States agricultural policy had the effect of removing supports which had maintained the world price for the fiber at artificially high levels.' 9 As prices spun into a sharp decline, production
costs continued to rise in the valley.
The real bludgeon, however, was the invasion of pink bollworm in
1966. By 1967 no part of the valley escaped the devastating insect.
Costs of production soared with the addition of necessary control
15. Minute 218, recommendation 1.
16. Gantz, supra note 13, at 500-502, Utton at 21-23.
17. Minute 218, recommendation 11.
18. Agreements by exchanges of notes extending the provisions of Minute No. 218 of the
International Boundary and Water Commission concerning the Colorado River salinity problem: Nov. 16, 1970, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 2478, T.I.A.S. No. 6988; Nov. 15, 1971, [19711 22
U.S.T. 1769, T.I.A.S. No. 7214. Mexico's presidential election was in 1970.
19. For a further discussion of United States cotton policy and its effect on the world
cotton market, see J. Sinclair, the Production, Marketing and Consumption of Cotton
(1968). For a discussion of the effect on Mexico, see J. Ladman & H. Rieneberg, The
Mexican Response to a Favorable World Cotton Market: A Case Study of Mexican Agricultural Development Bank Policy, Arizona Latin American Conference of Arizona Latin
American Studies Study No. 3 (1974).
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practices. Cotton production slid into a precipitous and steady decline, as can be observed in Figure I. The linked industries of cotton
gins and farm supplies were severely affected and many enterprises
were forced to close.
As if these problems were not enough, the United States terminated the bracero program in 1965, forcing large numbers of Mexican farm laborers in this country to return to their homeland-south
of the border. Many chose to settle in border cities, further exacerbating the already unhappy employment situation in Mexicali. The
valley, which had grown and prospered on an agriculture base in
general and cotton in particular, found itself in a position which
required diversification. Cotton clearly could not be counted on as
the driving force for the valley's economy.
The Mexicans responded with several major policy measures. First,
agriculture was diversified, as shown in Table IV. Since 1960 wheat
TABLE IV
Major Crops Grown in Mexicali Valley for Selected Years*
(hectares)
Crops
Cotton
Wheat
Barley

1950
129,003
13,925
2,246

Alfalfa
Safflower

1955
195,159
4,401
450

1960
139,974
42,613
558

1966
125,089
35,779
5,100

1972
49,759
55,481
16,432

7,124

4,217

6,300
2,706

16,665
15,786

Other

2,434

608

2,349

2,561

17,438

Total

147,608

207,742

189,711

177,535

171,561

87.3

93.9

73.7

70.4

29.0

Percent
Planted

to Cotton

*Includes crops grown in San Luis, Sonora, which are included as part of irrigation district.
The exact information of the hectarage in the San Luis Valley is not available for each year;
however, in 1972 there were 25,967 hectares planted in the valley.
Source: Secretaria de Recursos HidrAulicos, Distrito de Reigo #14, Mexicali.

production has been expanded in the valley and recently oilseeds
have been introduced, while cotton planting has fallen to 29 percent
of the total hectarage. Thus, crops with a higher degree of salt tolerance have been favored. This was a major factor more recently, when
the livestock rye-grass program was introduced in 1972. This program grass fattens young stock imported from Sonora before they
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are shipped to the United States for finishing. In the first year
50,000 head were pastured. 2 0
Second, Mexico also reacted by relying less on gravity irrigation,
which is at the mercy of water quality in the Colorado, and by
installing more wells, particularly in the northeastern corner of the
valley. Table III shows the considerable increase in hectarage
irrigated by wells after 1965.
Third, in 1968 construction was begun on a $97.8-million project
to rehabilitate the irrigation systems in the Mexicali Valley.' I This
project, in part financed by a loan from the World Bank, is scheduled
for completion over a seven-year period. The central objective of the
rehabilitation is to increase the efficiency of existing river and
ground-water supplies. The irrigation district had developed over the
years under the auspices of the Colorado River Land Company, the
Mexican Ministry of Water Resources, and the several individual users
without much integrated planning. Up until 1961 good quality water
was plentiful. As a consequence the existing system was quite inefficient, with substantial water losses through evaporation and seepage.
Soils were poorly drained, and drainage ditches were insufficient and
had fallen into a state of disrepair. With the advent of the salinity
problem large portions of the soils in the irrigation district were
rendered unusable, particularly in the southern parts.
The rehabilitation program is a comprehensive one which will
make more efficient use of water possible through a reduction in the
geographical space of the area irrigated, the construction of new delivery and drainage canals, the lining of all main delivery canals, the
improvement of drainage systems and canal gates, the leveling of
crop lands, the improvement of old wells and the perforation of new
wells, the construction of service roads and buildings, and the
acquisition of proper equipment. Ironically, by reducing the geographical extension of the irrigated zone at the same time the
planned improvements are carried out, the actual area under irrigation will be increased by over 33,000 hectares. Another beneficial
effect would be the reduction of ground water requirements from
891,685 to 567,436 acre feet per year. 2 To reduce the extent of
the irrigation zone will, however, force the relocation of large numbers of families from the southern portion of the old district-one of
the areas most heavily affected by salt deposits in the soil-to newly
opened lands in the more compact zone.
20. Gobierno del Baja California, Secretaria de Desarroilo Econ6mico, Programa de exportacion del ganado (1973) (typewritten manuscript).
21. Elizondo & Felix, supra note 3.
22. Id.
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Finally, the local economy has begun to expand its manufacturing
base. For example, between 1960 and 1970 manufacturing employment in Mexicali County increased by almost 6,000 persons so that
by 1970 total employment in manufacturing represented 15.3 percent of the total work force.2 3 Most of this increase came after 1967
with the establishment of the Border Industrialization Program and
new assembly plants in Mexicali. 2
As measured by data through 1972, the Mexicali economy is in
the process of adjusting to the problems it encountered in the
1960's, prominent among them the problem of the Colorado River
salinity. Even though manufacturing has expanded appreciably and
can be expected to continue to grow over time, the future of the area
depends principally upon agriculture. 2 Continued diversification
will be necessary, for the pink bollworm appears impossible to eradicate, and the necessary control measures impose an upper limit on
cotton production. Regardless of the fortunes of cotton, the history
of the Mexicali Valley's growth and prosperity has been linked to
agriculture. It has ever been and will continue to be a farming economy. For these reasons the Mexicali Valley, and indeed Mexico, have
major and vested interests in the waters of the Colorado River.
Naturally enough, they have been anxious to reach a satisfactory
solution to the water-quality problem with the United States.
MINUTE 242: THE GENESIS OF THE
SALINITY AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 1973
When President Echeverria first met officially with President
Nixon in 1972, a year after assuming office, the question of the
Colorado River was high on the agenda. A communique was issued
immediately pledging both countries to reach a permanent solution
to the salinity problem.2 6 In pursuit of this objective, President
Nixon announced a four-point program which has been substantially
23. Secretaria de Industria y Comercio, Direcci6n de Estadistica, IX Censo de poblaci6n,
estado de Baja California (1971).
24. The Border Industrialization Program is a policy measure undertaken by the Mexican
Government to alleviate the unemployment problem in the Mexican border cities. Under
this program machinery, parts, raw materials, and intermediate goods can be imported duty
free for assembly of goods in the border plants. The goods thus produced must be exported.
The value added in Mexico represents income to Mexicans. For a complete discussion, see D.
Baerresen, The Border Industrialization Program at Mexico (1971).
25. There is little likelihood that tourism will become very important to the valley. First,
the valley lacks historical, natural, and cultural attractions. Second, it is not contiguous to a
densely populated area in the United States which generates tourist services and trade.
26. Joint Communiqu6 of June 17, 1972, 8 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 1058 (1972) (Cited in 12 Natural Resources J. 578 (1972), Utton, supra note 8, at
99).
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accomplished since. The United States was to: (1) take immediate
action to improve the quality of water delivered to Mexico, (2)
appoint a special representative charged with finding a "permanent,
definitive and just" solution to the problem of salinity, (3) require
the special representative to tender his report by the end of 1972,
report to President
and (4) submit the approved version of the
2 7
Echeverria for his consideration and approval.
To improve the quality of water immediately, the International
Commission met in July, less than a month after President Nixon's
announcement, and agreed upon Minute 241, to supersede Minute
218. The new minute removed Wellton-Mohawk effluent entirely
from the Mexican quota and substituted in its place 118,000 acre
feet of water pumped out of Arizona's Yuma Mesa and/or taken
from above Imperial Dam, reserving all legal rights of both parties
pending agreement on a final resolution.' 8
Following Minute 241, Herbert Brownell, Attorney General of the
United States under President Eisenhower, was designated special
representative and finished his report in proper time, with approval
and transmission to President Echeverria in due course. Presumably,
for the Brownell Report has not been released publicly, this report
was the basis for the Salinity Agreement of August 1973.
Perhaps the only thing dealt with permanently and definitively (if
not specifically) in the Salinity Agreement of 1973 is the issue of
whether the United States has a duty to deliver water of usable
quality across the border and through the Morelos Dam under the
1944 Treaty. Much scholarship and diplomacy have been devoted to
this question.2 " However, by the legal tests these writers were able
to discover,3 the United States' assertion that it could "secure
credit for water of any kind, wherever it might come from, that
actually flowed across the boundary line,"' I was never defensible.
At this date the two countries are agreed that Mexico should receive
'

27. Id.
28. 67 Dep't of State Bull. 198 (1972); Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1971-72, at
102.
29. See, e.g., Hundley, supra note 13; Meyers & Noble, supra note 9, at 367, 385-86,
406-11 (1967); Hundley, supra note 9, at 495; Sepidveda, Mexican-A merican International
Water Quality Problems: Prospects and Perspectives, 12 Natural Resources J. 487 (1972),
Utton, supra note 8, at 8; Sobarzo, Salinity in the Colorado: An Interpretation of the
Mexican-American Treaty of 1944, 12 Natural Resources J. 510 (1972), Utton, supra note
8, at 31.
30. See, e.g., Lester, Pollution, in The Law of International Drainage Basins (A. Garretson, C. Olmstead & R. Hayton eds. 1967); Utton, International Water Quality Law, 13
Natural Resources J. 282 (1973). But see Gantz, supra note 13, at 505-509, Utton at 26-30.
31. Hearings on the Water Treaty with Mexico Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1945), cited in Gantz, supra note 13, at 498 n. 10, Utton
at 19 n. 10.
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1.5 million acre-feet of water each year and that the water should
conform to certain standards of utility for agricultural and other
3
beneficial use. The quantity is explicit in the Treaty of 1944, 2 and
3
althe quality may well have been implicit in that document,
ambiguous
an
though it has taken a long time to get what is still
commitment on the part of the United States into a signed, permanent agreement. Many of the other matters touched upon by the
recent Salinity Agreement raise a series of potential problems, which
at best will depend on a delicate coordination of state, federal, and
international factors.
All of the above is not to be overly critical of the 1973 document.
It is by any standard a stride forward, though perhaps more as an
exercise in identification than a resolution of problems.
MINUTE 242: CONTENTS AND PROBLEMS
A. Water Quality
When Minute 242 is broken down, several interesting facts emerge.
The new Salinity Agreement rejects the United States' 1961 argu3 4
and recognizes the duty
ment against any obligation as to quality
of the United States in two ways. First, the Agreement continues the
obligation begun in 1965 under Minute 218 to substitute cleaner
3
waters for the Wellton-Mohawk effluent. I Minute 218's formula
worked out to about 50,000 acre-feet of substitute water per year. 6
Under the more recent Minute 241, the obligation was explicitly
3
Under
increased to 118,000 acre-feet of better water per year.
of
effect
Minute 241 in 1972 the parties reserved all potential legal
such
no
their agreement, but the new Salinity Agreement contains
reservation, 3 so the United States has definitely abandoned its argument that it owed no obligation as to quality.
Second, the United States' ultimate responsibility is to deliver
water whose salinity is pegged to readings at Imperial Dam plus up to
115 additional parts per million. 9 Under the Salinity Agreement,
32.
of the
1945).
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

text.

Treaty with Mexico on Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and
Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, art. 10, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994 (effective Nov. 8,
See id. arts. 3, 27.
See Hundley, supra note 9, at 495, 499-500.
Minute 242, para. 2. Reprinted in this issue at p. 2.
See Gantz, supra note 13, at 504, Utton at 25.
Minute 242, para. 2. Reprinted in this issue at p. 2.
The same reservation was made in Minute 218. See note 17 supra and accompanying

39. Minute 242, para. 1(a). Reprinted in this issue at p. 2. There is a further tolerance of
± 30 ppm for measuring the allowable figure.
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the major means of salinity control is a desalting plant to be installed
at Yuma, Arizona. The permanent obligation will begin when Congress authorizes the funds for the plant to treat the Wellton-Mohawk
drainage. When the desalter comes on stream, substitution will no
longer be necessary, although quantities of its salt-charged, byproduct water will still be passed down into Mexico through an extension
of the bypass drain to the Santa Clara Slough. 4 1
If Minute 242 specifies a duty to deliver water of a quality measured against the Imperial Dam salinity reading, it leaves other matters in a more ambiguous state. Despite the parties' apparent confidence in the permanence and clout of the Imperial Valley's agricultural enterprise, 4 2 there is no absolute definition of the salinity level
which may be delivered to Mexico. In all likelihood the drafters of
Minute 242 have chosen a valid and durable standard for water
quality, but upstream salinity may continue to increase 4 3 and contingencies could dictate changes in crops, technology, and infrastruc40. See, Minute 242, paras. l(a), 10. Reprinted in this issue at p. 2. According to Minute
242, proper measures must be taken no later than July 1, 1974. Id. para. l(a).
41. See Office of Saline Water, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of Interior, Colorado
River International Salinity Control Project (1973). This is a comprehensive plan, including
the requisite environmental impact statements, of precisely how the desalinization of the
Wellton-Mohawk drainage will be handled.
The basic component of the program is the construction of a $98 million desalting
complex, which will cleanse part of the Wellton-Mohawk flow. The purified water will then
be combined with untreated drainage to result in about 132,000 acre-feet annually of
acceptable water from the Wellton-Mohawk Division. About 43,000 acre-feet of briny reject
water, a byproduct of the desalting process, would be "lost" to the system and allowed to
go down the drain past the Morelos Dam to the Santa Clara Slough. Id., at 15.
It may be some time before the desalting complex, scheduled for completion in December 1978, begins operations. In the meantime the United States will meet its obligation of
118,000 acre-feet of substitute water by taking from other available upstream sources until
replacement of a 49-mile stretch of the Coachella Canal with a new concrete-lined facility
can begin to save about 132,000 acre-feet of water formerly lost to evaporation and seepage
each year. This saving should cover for the bypassed Wellton-Mohawk effluent until the
desalting plant comes on stream. Id., at 9-10.
42. Mexico has long relied on the extensive agriculture of the Imperial Valley, whose
irrigation water is diverted so close above Morelos Dam, as a guaranty for its own water
quality. Such consideration may have helped in the ratification of the 1944 Treaty, with its
ambiguous provisions on quality. See Meyers & Noble, supra note 9, at 408.
At the time of his meeting with Nixon in 1972, President Echeverria insisted on Mexico's
right to waters of the "same quality as those derived from Imperial Dam." Cited by Gantz,
supra note 13, at 503 n. 27, Utton, at 24 n. 27.
43. It is almost certain to do so, barring major changes in water use techniques. See
Hearingson H.R. 12165 Before the Subcomrrt on Water & Power of the House Comm. on
Interior & Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 21-28 (1974). Steiner, Statement of the
Comm. of Fourteen on Behalf of the Governors of the Seven Colorado River Basin States.
This study projects salinity increasing to 1210 ppm at the Imperial Dam by the year 2000,
assuming no salinity control measures. Id. at 23.
Radical improvements in salinity control are possible if the institutional structures and
methods of irrigation use could be changed. See Martin, Economic Magnitudes and Economic Alternatives in Lower Basin Use of Colorado River Water, printed in this issue.
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ture in the Imperial Valley. If its agriculture changed too much in
order to accommodate poorer quality water, Mexico might refuse to
live by the standard of the new Salinity Agreement.
B. San Luis Valley
Another potential problem involves water deliveries to the San
Luis Valley, to the east of the main channel and south of the Morelos
Dam where diversion to the Mexicali Valley is made. Only 1.36
million acre-feet of Mexico's annual allocation must be delivered at
Morelos Dam, while the remaining 140,000 acre-feet may go over the
border at the town of San Luis, Sonora (located just opposite San
Luis, Arizona), "with a salinity substantially the same as that of the
waters ordinarily delivered there." 4 4 This portion of the Salinity
Agreement is important because the water delivered at San Luis has
normally been drainage from the Yuma Valley Division. Irrigation
sources for this division are a combination of pumped ground water
and the heavy return flow from the Yuma Mesa Division. The Yuma
Valley water apparently crosses the border with a high salinity index,
around 1700 parts per million, although it may be mixed with
Colorado River waters soon thereafter.4 At any rate no top salinity
level is designated, and there is some ambiguity as to what "ordinary" levels may have been. There is some reason to believe that not
only salinity levels, but water supply may change in the future, for
the delivery at San Luis may be affected by another part of Minute
242 dealing with the pumping of ground waters near the border. The
Agreement provides that neither country shall pump more than
160,000 acre feet of ground water annually within five miles of the
border in the San Luis zone.4 6 Neither, according to the Minute,
should either country take any other action for modification or new
development of "either the surface or the groundwater resources"
without prior consultation. a 7 In all probability this is an attempt to
avert an incipient pumping war which, among other things, could
hamper the United States' ability to meet its obligation at San Luis,
either in quantity or quality.
C. Water Supply
Water supply could even become a problem on a bigger scale,
although apparently the Committee of Fourteen which represents
users in the seven basin states does not now see this as a matter of
44.
45.
46.
47.

Minute 242, para.
Tabor, supra note
Minute 242, para.
Minute 242, para.

l(b). Reprinted in this issue at p. 2.
13, at 8.
5. Reprinted in this issue at p. 2.
6. Reprinted in this issue at p. 2.
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great concern. 4 8 The Lower Basin has experienced earlier and more
extensive development, and will have utilized all of its 7.5 million
acre-feet allocation with the completion of the Central Arizona Project sometime in the 1980's. To date, Upper Basin users have not
utilized all of their entitlement, which is equal to that of the Lower
Basin at 7.5 million acre-feet per year. This is fortunate for there
may not be sufficient water to allow for consumptive use of all
allocated water rights. There has been no pressing need to use that
much water in the Upper Basin, where consumptive use stands today
at around 3 million acre-feet per year, with no immediate projects in
sight which would drastically increase that figure. 4 9
The feeling is that, even if they wished to, the Upper Basin states
could not assert their claim to the water originally allocated to them.
The compacts create a priority for the Lower Basin, for they impose
an inescapable obligation to deliver a total of 75 million acre-feet at
Lee Ferry in any given ten-year period.' 0 Therefore, if petroleum
resources in the Upper Basin were to be exploited on a large scalewhich now seems imminent-pressures might build to change the
situation. In that case, mining and industrial use could simply supplant current agricultural users by buying them out and not increasing the overall demand for water. If agriculturd refused to cede, then
the logical response would be to attempt a renegotiation of the compact so that the Upper Basin could take advantage of its full original
entitlement or something approaching it more closely than the existing utilization. Estimates are that available flow in the river can
sustain consumptive use of 5.6 million acre feet in the Upper Basin
and still deliver 7.5 million acre feet at Lee Ferry annually.'
D. Damages to Mexico
Although the Salinity Agreement makes no outright award of
damages to Mexico, it does include a promise by the United States to
help with the "improvement and rehabilitation" of the Mexicali Valley, both by helping to secure favorable financing arrangements in
general and, specifically, by providing "nonreimbursable assistance"
48. P. Furnish, Interview with Wesley Steiner, Chairman of the Committee of Fourteen,
Mar. 1, 1974.
49. Id.
50. The Colorado River Compact of 1922 enjoins the Upper Basin states "not [to] cause
the flow of the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75,000,000 acre-feet
for any period of 10 consecutive years ..
" Colorado River Compact, Nov. 24, 1922, art.
Ill(d), 70 Cong. Rec. 324, 325 (1928). In other words, the Upper Basin would simply not
be able to use all of its entitlement of 7.5 million acre-feet annually, since the Lee Ferry
obligation takes precedence. Like the salinity problem before 1961, events have not yet
tested this proposition.
51. Interview with Steiner, supra note 48.
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which will aid Mexico in dealing with the salinity problem.5 2 Negotiations on the settlement award, for that is what it is, have not yet
begun. Whether they will ultimately prove tortured or uneventful
depends on the parties' attitudes, and (probably) satisfactory compliance with the rest of Minute 242's provisions.
E. Bypass Drain
The United States has committed itself to finance the construction
of a bypass drain to carry the briny byproduct waters of the Wellton-Mohawk desalting complex to the Santa Clara Slough in Mexico
without mingling them or counting them as a part of Mexico's
quota.'
This seems to be the most concrete and easily served of the
United States' obligations, for all it need do is build a portion of the
canal on the U.S. side of the border and give the money to Mexico,
which will then construct the rest of it in that country. Still, a
congressional appropriation is required, and that may well be tied to
other, more problematical issues regarding the river before a vote is
finally called.
F. Ecosystem in the Gulf of California
The briny water effluent from the bypass drain, in combination
with the increased salt content of the Colorado River water, could
possibly have severe effects on the ecosystem in the Gulf of California. This could have serious consequences for the important fishing
industry located in the San Felipe area, just south of the Colorado
River delta. This region is one of the country's major shrimp fishing
areas, and the product in frozen form is principally exported to the
United States. Should the ecological balance be upset, severe damage
to this industry might be a consequence.' ' This, as well as other
undetermined potential effects, in turn could be grounds for continued controversy between the two countries.
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION FOR MINUTE 242
At the time of this writing (March, 1974) the Congress of the
United States has under consideration two bills which would deal
with the problem of the Colorado River's salinity and its obligation
to Mexico. How these bills handle the problems identified above will
almost certainly prove to be the first, most important measure of
52. Minute 242, para. 7. Reprinted in this issue at p. 2.
53. Minute 242, paras. 3, 4. Reprinted in this issue at p. 2.
54. The Phoenix Gazette, Nov. 5, 1973, § F, at 8.
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Minute 242's longevity and viability. The two competing bills were
respectively introduced by the Executive Branch and by a group of
congressmen from the Colorado River Basin in the House Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs. By breaking down these proposals,
one may get a fair idea of the probabilities of final resolution of the
salinity dispute between Mexico and the United States. Substantial
parts of the two pieces of potential legislation are very similar and
presumably will be passed in any case. The present and future controversy will swirl around the more extended provisions of the congressmen's bill.
The Colorado River salinity question is precisely the sort of multifaceted issue which most clearly demonstrates Congress' potential for
logrolling. A substantial block of powerful congressmen will line up,
oblivious of party lines, to assure that final legislation proves suitable
to the rights and interests of the states they represent. One of their
points of leverage appears to be to tie the entire package into one
bill, which must be satisfactory in all respects before passage. There
appear to exist almost no countervailing interests to which the Executive might appeal to overcome this tactic.
The Executive Branch -has submitted a bill, H.R. 12834, which
would charge the Secretary of State with responsibility for carrying
out the measures necessary to implement Minute 242. The administration's bill is generally rather sketchy in its coverage and provides
for the most basic matters covered in the Salinity Agreement. To
specify, H.R. 12834 deals with:
(1) the installation of a desalting
complex to purify the Wellton5
Mohawk drainage water;

5

(2) the "rehabilitation and betterment" of the Coachella Canal in
California and the reduction of water losses in its flow;5 6
(3) the financing of the Santa Clara Slough Drain from the
Morelos Dam south in Mexico, for bypassing brackish waters;
57 and
(4) the accompanying adjustment in payments, water, and property rights affected by the above programs.
Too often vague and a bit ambiguous, this bill sweeps a broad path
within which the objectives of Minute 242 may be accomplished if a
vigorous and concerned Secretary of State gives it priority and impetus. This bill interjects the Department of State into management
55. H.R. 12834, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1(a) (1974).

56. Id. § 1 (f)-(h).
57. Id. § 1(a).
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of water in the Colorado River Basin at the top of the hierarchy, and
would make the Department of the Interior subservient to the
former. Insofar as the obligation to Mexico must be served, perhaps
this is a proper approach. The Colorado River is an international
stream, and the international ramifications of its water management
are inescapable. However, one wonders if the same objective cannot
be met without creating a confusing intrusion of one branch of the
Executive into the field of expertise, normal operation, and knowledge of another.
The second bill before the House, H.R. 12165, was introduced by
Representative Johnson of California and eleven other basin-state
congressmen and stands in sharp contrast to the administration's
draft.' " First, the bill would place the burden of execution on the
Secretary of the Interior. Then H.R. 12165 spells out at length and
in minute detail not only what is to be done, but carefully and
precisely how. The United States' obligation to Mexico is comprehensively defined and the Secretary of the Interior is bound to carry
it out, but virtually without State Department participation.
Not surprisingly for a piece of legislation drafted by legislators
whose constituents depend on water rights for a good part of their
economy, existence, and amenities, H.R. 12165 demonstrates cautious regard for existing rights and circumstances. The bill emanates a
concern that matters agonized to resolution in past years do not again
become controversies. There is a specific limitation against curtailing
existing rights in electricity, a perennial problem along with water in
the Southwest, to provide for the desalting complex at Yuma.' 9 At
several points the bill states explicitly that costs of the program shall
be exlusively those of the Federal Government. 6 0 In contrast to the
administration bill, which might be characterized as an expression of
good intent and a broad authorization, H.R. 12165 is a blueprint for
exactly how the entire accommodation is to be worked out. Careful
attention has been expended on specific calculation and allocation of
costs. If the congressmen-sponsors of H.R. 12165 wanted to assure
themselves and their constituents that no inadvertent or unforeseen
actions of the Federal Government would cost them crucial rights or
impose onerous burdens, they seem to have been true to that goal.
58. The other sponsoring congressmen are: Udall and Steiger of Arizona; Burke, Clausen,
Hosmer, and Ketchum of California; Towell of Nevada; Lujan and Runnels of New Mexico;
Owens of Utah; and Roncalio of Wyoming.
59. H.R. 12165, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(b)(2) (1974).
60. See, e.g., id. § 102(b), § 103(b). In H.R. 12165's Title II, which deals with upstream
salinity control, costs are to be split 75-25 between the Federal Government and the basin
funds. See id. § 205(a)(1),(2).
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SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN H.R. 12834 AND H.R. 12165
A. Ground-WaterPumping
Perhaps even more important than the fundamental difference in
attitude, and probably symptomatic of it, are the matters covered in
H.R. 12165 which are not even alluded to in H.R. 12834. The congressmen's bill would authorize the Secretary of the Interior to instigate a pumping operation on the north side of the international
border at San Luis, Arizona, if no "comprehensive agreement on
groundwater" between Mexico and the United States is forthcoming
within two years. 6' Implementation of such a provision, discreetly
absent from the H.R. 12834, would signal a pumping war with
Mexico. The states, through their Committee of Fourteen, feel that
Mexico may have already begun such a war, through their unilateral
pumping program in the upper San Luis Valley. 6 2
Ground-water pumping may lower the water table in any case, but
authorities in the United States and Arizona are preoccupied that the
most prejudicial effect of the Mexican pumping may be on the
Arizona side of the border. Pumping ground-water creates a cone-like
depression in the water table with its lowest level at the pumping
point. Water then flows "downhill" out of the nearby underground
areas to the cone. If the Mexican pumping operation is set up close
by the Arizona border, as much of it is, its negative impact on
groundwater levels in Arizona is maximized. One means of offsetting
such an effect is to set up a counteracting pumping system on the
Arizona side, so as to either stabilize the water table at a lower level
or, if Arizona can pump faster, create an underground flow back to
the north. Both Minute 242 and H.R. 12165 contain a veiled threat
of countermeasures if no agreement is reached, although the limitation of 160,000 acre-feet per year from such pumping is a tacit
promise not to go beyond the amount currently extracted by the
Mexicans. 6 3 Under the Agreement the United States could presumably offset, but not surpass, this amount.
There are long-range implications of the ground-water question. At
present the San Luis Valley gets much of its water from the Yuma
Valley Division's return flow, which enters Mexico through the San
Luis Drain. If pumping systems are installed on both sides of the
border, the drain may well dry up. The United States could compensate and meet the obligation of 140,000 acre feet annually by deliver61. Id. § 103. One of the amendments proposed by the Committee of Fourteen would
instigate pumping immediately, striking the two-year grace period. See Hearings,supra note
43, at 59.
62. Hearings, supra note 43, at 8-10.
63. See Minute 242, para. 5. Reprinted in this issue at p. 2.
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ing into Mexico the water it pumped from its side of the San Luis
area, which is likely to be more saline than the return flow. The
pumping system on the Arizona side would then serve the sole purpose of preventing unanswered loss of underground water to Mexico,
for it would not result in an increased supply for United States water
users, and the salinity of the water delivered at San Luis might
change for the worse. In the latter event, the two countries might
well be faced with a new and heated controversy. Mexico initiated
the pumping of ground water in 1964. There have been substantial
and negative effects on the United States' side of the border, but
Mexico can argue that it was forced to pump to obtain usable water
after 1961. The United States might counter that Mexico's pumping
forced it to initiate its own extraction operation, and thus plead that
it is not responsible for any negative effects south of the border. And
so on.

B. Upstream Salinity Sources and H.R. 12165
Minute 242 is not the only recent official activity regarding the
salinity of the Colorado River. In 1972 the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) identified dissolved salts as a pollutant subject to the
provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 6 4 In February and April of that year a federal-state conference on the pollution of the Colorado River resulted in a series of conclusions and
recommendations later approved by EPA's then head, William Ruckelshaus. 6 I The first recommendation went straight to the point:
I. It is recommended that:
A salinity policy be adopted for the Colorado River system that
would have as its objective the maintenance of salinity concentrations at or below levels presently found in the lower main stem. In
implementing the salinity policy objective for the Colorado River
system, the salinity problem must be treated as a basinwide problem
that needs to be solved to maintain Lower Basin water salinity at or
below present levels while the Upper Basin continues to develop its
compact-apportioned waters.

Both Special Representative Brownell, drafting his report in late
1972, and the negotiators of Minute 242 in 1973 relied on an upstream salinity-control program as a virtual certainty.6 6 The Mex64. See 40 C.F.R. part 415 (1974) (Inorganic Chemicals Manufacturing Point Source
Category); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § § 1151-1175 (1971), now
codified, as amended at 33 U.S.C. § § 1251-1376 (Supp. III, 1973).
65. Federal-State Conference on the Matter of Pollution of the Interstate Waters of the
Colorado River and Its Tributaries, February, April 1972. Approval by Ruckelshaus was in
June 1972.
66. Hearings, supra note 43, at 33.
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icans were fully informed of the United States' intention to instigate
pollution-checking measures which would significantly reduce salinity at Imperial Dam and hold it down over time. It would be difficult

to believe that both sides at the negotiating table did not act in
contemplation of effective and forthcoming control measures. 6 7
Such measures are in doubt, however. The Executive's Office of
Management and Budget has cut back many if not most of the programs in the Department of the Interior which dealt with intermediate and long-range planning for salinity control on the Colorado, as
well as water augmentation. 6 ' This has not had a tranquilizing effect

on the Lower Basin states and the Committee of Fourteen, although
Mexico apparently either is not apprised of the potential effect as yet
or feels no need for immediate concern. Title II of H.R. 12165 seems
to be aimed specifically at getting the Federal Government back into
action on its commitment to control salinity in the Colorado. Whereas H.R. 12834 makes no reference to upstream programs, about half
of H.R. 12165's substance is devoted exclusively to that problem.
Title II designates four key projects for immediate action and would
appropriate $121.5 million to fund them. In addition, it identifies a

number of potential future projects and instructs the Secretary of
the Interior to go about the proper feasibility studies and planning.6 9

The projects chosen for immediate implementation in H.R. 12165
apparently have in common a high current contribution of salts to
the Colorado River and a high probability of successful control. They
include: Grand Valley 7 0 and Paradox Valley 7' in Colorado, Las
Vegas Wash 7 2 in Nevada and Crystal Geyser 7 in Utah.
67. Mexico's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emilio Rabasa, stated at the time Minute 242
was signed, "The final result [of Minute 242] will be that Mexicali farmers will have
forever-they and their children and their children's children-water whose annual average
salinity will never exceed 1010 ppm, which is perfectly acceptable." Hearings, supra note
43, at 33-34.
68. Interview with Steiner, supra note 48.
69. H.R. 12165, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 203 (1974).
70. Id. § 202(2). The 80,000-acre irrigation system in the Grand Valley, Colorado,
whose return flow percolates through a shale formation with an extremely high salt content,
carrying as muzh as 500,000 tons of salt annually into the Colorado River.
71. Id. § 202(1). The Paradox Valley, Colorado, subterranean salt dome which annually
contributes over 200,000 tons of salt to the Colorado as the waters of a tributary, the
Dolores, run above it.
72. Id. § 202(4). The natural channel which carries municipal and industrial wastes from
Las Vegas, Nevada, into Lake Mead and accounts for about 209,000 tons of dissolved solids
in the Colorado each year.
73. Id. § 202(3). An abandoned oil test well, now known as the Crystal Geyser, in Utah
which erupts several times daily sending water with a salinity of 11,000 to 14,000 ppm
pouring into the Green River and ultimately adding around 3,000 tons of salt yearly to the
Colorado.
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If H.R. 12165 were adopted as written, the predicted reduction
would be from the present total of 9 12,000 tons of salt attributed to
these four sources to about .360,000 tons."4 This should reduce
salinity readings at the Imperial Dam by about 60 ppm. We find it
hard to quarrel with the basin-state congressmen's reasoning or their
draft proposal. It is inevitable that salinity levels will continue to
climb along with increased upstream development, unless action is
taken to control pollution. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
has not yet been applied to agricultural uses and there is much to be
defined in that law's application, but the peculiar exigencies of the
Colorado River situation would seem to command affirmative action
to control both agricultural and other uses which might contribute to
the salt levels of the river.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The waters of the Colorado River are life's blood to the economy
of the Mexicali Valley, one of the leading agricultural areas in Mexico. Consequently, that country can be expected to have a keen
long-term interest in the quality of Colorado River waters delivered
to Mexicali from the United States.
Minute 242, the Salinity Agreement of 1973, was a jointly determined effort to establish a permanent and definitive solution to the
water quality problem. The Agreement, apparently drafted with the
best of intent, is a major stride in this direction. It has established a
duty on the United States as upstream riparian user to guarantee
water of some usable quality to Mexico. However, Minute 242 appears to leave a number of important problems that may require
further resolution. These are: (1) the ultimate question of what
absolute level of salinity is acceptable and proper for the Mexicali
Valley, (2) the problem of acceptable and proper water quality for
deliveries into the San Luis Valley, (3) the issue of ground-water
pumping at the border near San Luis, (4) the amount of reparation
or damages which will be paid to Mexico, (5) the potential ecological
effects in the Gulf of California, and (6) the overall long-term coordination of international interests and programs involving the Colorado
River.
Happily for Mexico, it appears that the unfortunate set of circumstances which gave rise to the salinity controversy in the early 1960's
has been replaced by several positive factors in the United States
74. Interview with Steiner, supra note 48. On June 24, 1974, Congress enacted H.R.
12165 (as the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, Pub. L. No. 93-320) in substantially the same form as described herein [Ed.].
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which may ease the seriousness of some of the problems and facilitate their satisfactory decision. First, there is a strong likelihood that
legislative implementation of Minute 242 by the United States Congress will tend to insure Mexico of the high-quality water it desires,
simply because the Lower Basin states will protect their own interests through that legislation. Circumstances such as that of the Wellton-Mohawk drainage, which affected no United States interest but
did damage to Mexico, seem unlikely to arise again, leaving Mexico in
common cause with the United States downstream users.
Additionally, the creation of the Environmental Protection
Agency and the enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control
law signal an awakening of general United States concern over the
salinity problem which should have a spillover effect for the Mexicali
Valley.
We here predict no primrose path for those dealing with the problems of allocation and quality control of Colorado River waters,
neither as a result of Minute 242 nor of any other development
treated herein. Many difficult questions, undoubtedly some yet to be
revealed by time and events, have not been resolved. The Salinity
Agreement of 1973 in and of itself is not sufficient to avoid future
controversies. For the time being, presuming passage of satisfactory
implementing legislation, it represents a strong, positive stride forward. However, it would seem that as future issues develop, they will
almost certainly require new agreements by the IBWC which supersede and/or supplement Minute 242. It is possible that at some
future date a new water treaty will have to be negotiated.

